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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the impact of partial privatization on performance of state-owned banks 
using data from the Indian banking industry during the period 1986-2003. We test the 
hypothesis that privatization leads to improvement in performance even when the 
government retains controlling stakes. Employing the technique of stochastic frontier 
analysis, we obtain bank-specific estimates of total factor productivity which we consider as a 
measure of performance along with four accounting measures. We then employ panel 
regression models to assess the impact of partial privatization on these performance 
indicators. We find that partial privatization resulted in significant improvement in 
performance of state-owned banks. This finding is robust to alternative model specifications 
and different techniques for controlling potential selection bias. The results suggest that faced 
with political opposition to full privatization, even if the government does not relinquish 
control, the exposure to market discipline through partial privatization may be an effective 
way of improving performance of state-owned banks. 
 
Keywords: Banking; Partial Privatization; Stochastic Frontier; Productivity; Performance. 
Paper Type: Research Paper 
1 
 
Partial Privatization and Bank Performance: Evidence from India 
1. Introduction  
Several studies have empirically examined the effect of privatization on firm performance. 
Studies have concentrated on various aspects of this issue such as the mode and extent of 
privatization, sources of public sector inefficiency, measures of firm performance and the 
various econometric issues therein. However the evidence on whether privatization leads to 
improvement in performance is mixed. A survey by Vining and Boardman (1992) found that 
out of 87 papers considered only 28 reported performance improvement after privatization. 
Even when privatization does work it is not clear whether it is a feasible approach in many 
contexts. For instance, political opposition to privatization may prevent outright sale of state-
owned enterprises. Faced with such political hurdles, governments may often resort to partial 
privatization as an alternative.  
 
Partial privatization may lead to improvements in firm performance if the managerial view of 
privatization holds. This view emphasizes the monitoring and disciplining roles of stock 
markets and the consequent benefits of improved managerial incentives even when the 
privatization is only partial (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). On the other hand a political view 
of privatization opines that there may not be any performance gains from partial privatization 
if the government retains control of the firms after privatization. In such a situation political 
interference would continue to hamper the performance of state-owned firms and the 
privatization would not yield any benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Which of these two 
effects would ultimately dominate in the case of partially privatized firms is not clear from 
the theoretical literature. There are other benefits of privatization such as improved access to 
external resources as creditors might perceive a privatized firm to be more credit-worthy than 
a state-owned firm that would receive political protection in case it defaults. Privatized firms 
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would in general face lower costs of raising funds and are expected to potentially benefit 
from foreign direct investment and associated transfer of technology.  
 
According to Gupta (2005), most studies on ownership and performance that find 
performance of firms improving after privatization consider cases where management control 
is transferred to private owners, but not much is known about the effectiveness of partial 
privatization. We attempt to examine this issue in the context of Indian banks which have 
undergone a programme of partial privatization since the launch of banking reforms in the 
early1990s. Indian banking offers a unique case study as it is characterized by the presence of 
public sector banks (i.e. fully state-owned as well as partially privatized banks) and private 
sector banks (domestic and foreign) thus covering the entire range of ownership types. Most 
studies have found that banks in India exhibited improvement in performance over the last 
two decades (see e.g. Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003; Sensarma, 2006). This has been 
attributed to the economic reforms of 1991 which engendered a series of measures such as 
interest rate deregulation and branch de-licensing. While the private banks outperformed the 
public sector banks in the earlier years, in recent years the latter have been able to bridge the 
gap by taking advantage of the deregulatory measures (Bhaumik and Dimova, 2004; 
Sensarma, 2006). However the public sector banks have been considered as a single group in 
these studies and no distinction was made between those banks that were partially privatized 
and those that remained fully state-owned. 
 
India is an emerging economy where a shift from government control to a more liberalized 
economy in the 1990s meant that private participation in the economy has become 
significant. On the other hand, because of its vibrant democracy a strong political opposition 
exists that has prevented full privatization of many state-owned enterprises. This is especially 
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true for state-owned banks due to their underlying social objectives which are perceived by 
the political opposition to be under threat if the banks were to be privatized. Owing to the 
political opposition to bank privatization, India has followed a piecemeal approach where the 
government has been relinquishing some of its stakes in one or a few banks every year. We 
study this partial privatization programme by examining bank performance over a long period 
of 1986 to 2003[1] which allows us to evaluate whether the managerial view or the political 
view has dominated in the case of Indian banks. In particular we are able to separately 
examine the roles of listing on the stock exchange and the magnitude of privatization. The 
very act of listing a state-owned bank on the stock exchange can generate market discipline 
as the Indian stock market regulator imposes strict disclosure norms on all listed entities. On 
the other hand the degree of divesture could influence the performance of banks as it proxies 
the extent of monitoring and disciplining the bank is subjected to by private shareholders.  
 
Measurement of bank performance is a contentious issue in itself and there is an ongoing 
debate over what is a good measure. The productivity literature suggests that total factor 
productivity can be a useful measure of performance as it is not influenced by accounting 
practices. This is a popular approach in banking as total factor productivity can be computed 
based on the cost function and it is often argued that cost based measures are more 
appropriate for analyzing public sector units which may be more concerned with cost 
minimization rather than profit maximization (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). We assume 
that banks minimize costs by choosing the output level and therefore we adopt a cost based 
indicator of productivity defined using the Divisia index. In addition, we employ a host of 
accounting indicators of profitability and efficiency of banks. These indicators are justified 
on the grounds that one of the stated goals of banking sector reforms in India was to achieve 
improvement in profitability and efficiency. We study a total of four accounting indicators of 
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profitability and efficiency to complement the Divisia index of total factor productivity in our 
analysis of partial privatization. 
 
Analyzing data over the period 1986-2003, we find that partial privatization led to an 
improvement in performance of Indian state-owned banks with the effect being more 
persistent for total factor productivity than for accounting indicators. On an average, partially 
privatized banks experienced an increase of three to four percent in total factor productivity 
growth. These findings are robust to many alternative model specifications and controls for 
potential selection bias. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant 
empirical literature. Section 3 presents a brief overview of the banking sector in India and the 
partial privatization programme. Section 4 discusses the data and the methodology employed. 
Section 5 contains the main empirical findings and their discussion. Section 6 highlights the 
robustness of the findings to alternative ways of accounting for potential endogeneity and 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
The empirical literature on privatization has found significant performance gains from 
privatizing former state-owned firms. Boardman and Vining (1989) examined the 
performance of large non-US corporations in 1983 to conclude that private firms are more 
efficient than their public counterparts. Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) and 
D‟Souza and Megginson (1999) compared pre- and post-privatization performance of a large 
number of firms from industrialized as well as developing countries to show that privatization 
resulted in significant gains in profitability, sales and efficiency.  In the context of transition 
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economies, Frydman et al. (1999) studied 200 firms from the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland to show that for state-owned firms that are sold to outsiders (i.e. not managers or 
employees), privatization yields significant improvement in performance. Furthermore, the 
performance gains appear to be in terms of revenue enhancements rather than cost savings. 
 
However the empirical literature specific to the banking industry does not provide unanimous 
evidence on the question of whether privatization helps to improve performance. Megginson 
(2005) provides an excellent survey of the empirical literature on bank privatization. Based 
on a review of a large number of studies he concludes that private banks are usually more 
efficient than state-owned banks. However in case of partial privatization, the effects on 
performance depend on institutional and regulatory environments. Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel 
(2005) studied cost and profit efficiency of 59 banks from six advanced transition countries 
and provide evidence in support of privatization. The analysis revealed that banks that are 
sold to a strategic foreign owner early in the period of the privatization programme exhibit 
better performance than state-owned banks and those banks that are privatized later. Boubakri 
et al. (2005) analyzed the privatization experience of 81 banks from 22 developing countries. 
Analysis of accounting indicators of performance revealed that the poor performers were 
selected for privatization and the impact of privatization on performance was ambiguous. 
While profitability increased, the impact on efficiency, risk exposure and capitalization 
largely depended on whether the control of the privatized bank rested with the government, 
foreign investors, local industrial groups or individuals.  
 
To cite some country specific studies, Nakane and Weintraub (2005) estimated total factor 
productivity for 242 Brazilian banks and concluded that state-owned banks were less 
productive than their private counterparts and that privatization increased their productivity. 
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Beck, Cull and Jerome (2005) studied the Nigerian banking system using data on accounting 
indicators of performance for 69 banks. They concluded that privatization led to performance 
improvement and those banks that continued to have minority government ownership 
performed worse than the fully privatized banks. On the other hand privatization has been 
shown to have negative effects in China (Chen, Li and Moshirian, 2005) and in Pakistan 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy, 2005). Experience from Mexico suggests that bank 
privatization may fail unless there are strong institutions and well defined property rights 
(Haber, 2005). In fact Mexico‟s first experiment in privatization led to insolvency of the 
banks and the second experiment produced a risk-averse banking system. While most of these 
papers are concerned with whether privatization led to improvement in bank performance, the 
issue of partial privatization and bank performance has been scarcely studied.  
 
Gupta (2005) studied the impact of partial privatization on firm performance. Employing data 
on Indian state-owned firms belonging to the manufacturing and the non-banking services 
sectors, she investigated the impact of partial privatization on performance. The performance 
variables considered were accounting indicators of profitability, productivity and investment. 
The analysis revealed that partial privatization did lead to improvement in performance. 
Since the government retained management control of these firms even after the partial 
privatization exercise, the improvement in performance could not be attributed to the 
elimination of political interference. Gupta (2005) attributed it to the amelioration of the 
agency problem associated with government ownership that got reduced with the stock 
market now enforcing managerial discipline and corporate control.  In the case of Indian 
banks, Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) studied the impact of deregulation on the productivity 
of Indian banks and found that while productivity of private banks improved, public sector 
banks did not respond to deregulation. The issue of partial privatization of public sector 
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banks was not considered by them. Mohan (2005) and Sathye (2005) used difference of 
means tests to conclude that financial parameters of performance for partially privatized 
banks in India were superior to those of public banks. However both these studies used only 
five years of data and did not consider the determinants of performance. 
 
3. Overview of Indian Banking 
The banking sector plays a crucial role in fostering economic growth, especially in an 
emerging economy such as India. Banks play an important role, inter alia, in the mobilization 
of savings and capital formation whose importance for an emerging economy cannot be 
overemphasized. The dominant presence of banking in the Indian economy can be gauged 
from the fact that aggregate deposits stood at 48 percent of GDP in 2002-03 and bank credit 
to the government and commercial sector stood at 26 percent and 33 percent of GDP 
respectively in 2002-03. Thus, in terms of size, banking occupies an important position in the 
economy. Prior to 1992, the banking sector in India was highly regulated and dominated by 
the public sector banks. With the developmental objectives of providing adequate credit, 
there were severe constraints on operational decisions. In addition, the banks were impeded 
by regulations on the pricing of financial products imposed by the banking regulator, viz. the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 
 
However, towards the early nineties the government realized that an excessive focus on 
quantitative achievements was making many banks inefficient, unprofitable and under-
capitalized. Recognizing these problems, the RBI launched the banking sector reforms in 
1992 on the recommendations of the first Narasimham committee on financial sector reforms 
(RBI, 1991). This led to the deregulation of entry, interest rates, branch de-licensing and 
allowed public sector banks to access the capital markets for raising equity. At the same time 
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there were a number of changes in statutory norms, viz. a gradual reduction of the Cash 
Reserve Ratio (CRR) and the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR), setting up of a minimum 8 
percent Capital to Risk-weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR), and an imposition of stringent 
income recognition and provisioning norms. The second round of reforms in the banking 
sector followed the report of the second Narasimham committee (RBI, 1998) that laid stress 
on prudential measures like higher CRAR, allowing for market risk on government securities, 
stricter Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) norms, introduction of Assets-Liabilities 
management and risk management guidelines.  
 
The banking sector reforms in India, initiated in 1992, were intended to impart enhanced 
efficiency, productivity and profitability into the system. One key element of the reforms 
process was the partial privatization of public sector banks.  While the government retained 
controlling stakes, up to 49 percent of equity was sold to investors. However this was done in 
a piece-meal manner, with one or two banks getting listed in every year after 1993. Table 1 
presents the timeline and extent of privatization of the public sector banks. Table 2 denotes 
the resulting shareholding pattern of the banks which suggests that while ownership is fairly 
diversified, foreign institutions ended up holding large stakes in the public sector banks and 
could act as an important source of market discipline. 
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Even though the government continues to hold controlling stakes due to political reasons, it 
was felt that subjecting public sector banks to market discipline through stock exchange 
listing was an effective way of improving their performance as it provided a method of 
alleviating the agency problem arising out of government ownership. The stock market 
regulator has elaborate disclosure norms for new issues as well as continuing disclosures 
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ranging from financial information to dividend policy, business risks and corporate 
governance requirements[2]. Banks intending to get listed on the stock exchange have to 
provide the auditor‟s report on their financial statements along with the management‟s 
discussion and analysis of financial conditions and results of operations. The business 
strategies as well as risks categorized as company specific and general factors have to be 
disclosed. Other requirements of the regulator include a due diligence certificate from a lead 
merchant banker, grading details from a credit rating agency, appointment of a compliance 
officer and details of outstanding litigations. Corporate governance requirements include 
details of management and shareholding structure, compensation of directors, information on 
audit committee, shareholder/ investor grievance committee etc.  
 
Listed banks are therefore subject to stringent disclosures facilitating monitoring by investors 
which provides an alternative governance mechanism to the RBI‟s monitoring. The two are 
different in many aspects e.g. the RBI‟s focus is on prudential regulation and its compliance 
(and the information is not released to the public) rather than financial details and corporate 
governance (readily accessible by investors) which is a primary focus of the stock exchange 
disclosures. The Basel-II accord acknowledges that market discipline is an important 
governance mechanism which can complement the industry regulations and supervisory 
processes. Such disclosure norms and the consequent market discipline have made the public 
sector bank managements more cognizant of the market consequences of their activities, 
which may have led to the improvement in the performance of these banks (Mohan, 2006). 
On the other hand it may be argued that listing alone may not produce the desired effects 
unless a bank is fully privatized. This is because of the moral hazard generated by the implicit 
government guarantee in a partially privatized bank which could weaken the monitoring 
efforts of shareholders. The managers too are aware that the government may bail them out 
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especially if the state is a large shareholder (Megginson, 2005). Therefore, the effects of 
partial privatization and listing on performance are hardly unambiguous. It is against this 
backdrop that we empirically examine the impact of the partial privatization programme on 
bank performance in India. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology and Data 
4.1 Total Factor Productivity 
We use total factor productivity (TFP, henceforth) as our first measure of bank performance 
as “productivity gains are the dominant factor in post privatization outcomes” (La Porta and 
Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999). Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), we estimate three 
components of TFP growth, viz. those attributable to technical progress, returns to scale and 
efficiency change and then aggregate them as 
 321
PTFPTFPTFPTF  
     (1) 
 
Until very recently, econometric models of TFP growth had ignored the last term i.e. the role 
of efficiency change. However, as Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) purposefully argue, when 
individual production units vary greatly in terms of their cost or productive efficiency, 
ignoring this component is likely to give biased estimates of productivity growth. While the 
first two components of TFP growth i.e., technical progress and returns to scale, can be 
estimated from a standard cost function, the last component, i.e., efficiency change, requires 
the estimation of a cost frontier. Since the production technologies of banks are unknown a 
priori, we estimate efficiency as the deviation from the efficient cost frontier where the best-
practice banks operate. To do that we consider the following stochastic cost frontier: 
 
ln E = ln C (Y,W,t) + U + V                                          (2) 
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where, E = WX is total expenditure, X = (x1,…,xN)‟ is a (N x 1) vector of inputs, W = 
(w1,…,wN )‟ is a (N x 1) vector of input prices, Y = (y1,…,yM)‟ is a (M x 1) vector of 
outputs, t is a time trend that proxies technical change, C(Y,W,t) is the deterministic kernel of 
the stochastic cost frontier, U ≥ 0  is the one-sided cost  inefficiency term, and V is a random 
variable with  zero mean. Appendix A explains how the TFP growth in equation (1) can be 
arrived at based on the stochastic cost frontier in equation (2).  
 
4.2 Estimation Procedure 
To arrive at the measure of TFP growth based on its three components we first need to 
estimate the stochastic cost frontier given in equation (2). This requires the specification of 
the random terms U and V and a functional form for the deterministic kernel C (Y,W,t). We 
assume that the inefficiency term uit follows a truncated normal distribution with mean μ and 
constant variance, while the random term vit follows the usual normal distribution with a zero 
mean and constant variance[3]. Specifically, we assume, uit ~ iidN
+
 (μ, σ2u) and vit ~ iidN (0, 
σ2v). For the deterministic kernel we employ the translog (transcendental logarithm) 
specification. The translog function (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau, 1975) can be viewed as 
a second order approximation of any unknown function and it provides flexibility to a 
parametric functional form.
 
Combining the error terms and the deterministic kernel, the cost 
frontier function is specified as:  
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where wjit denotes the price of input j and ymit denotes the amount of output m produced by 
bank i in period t, respectively. The dependent variable, operating cost, is the sum of 
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establishment expenses and physical capital expenses[4]. We impose the standard restrictions 
of symmetry and linear homogeneity for estimating the parameters of equation (3): 
aml = alm and bjk = bkj; 
j
bj =1, 
j
bjk = 0  k, 
j
amj = 0 m, 
j
bjt = 0. 
 
A widely debated issue in the banking literature is the definition of banking inputs and 
outputs, and more specifically the classification of deposits in this respect. The two 
alternative approaches to determining what constitutes inputs and outputs of banks are the 
production approach and the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). The 
production approach considers labor and capital as inputs and number of processed accounts 
as outputs. The intermediation approach considers deposits as inputs and defines loans and 
investments as outputs. We adopt the production approach, which has been the most used 
approach in the Indian context (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003), and thereby consider deposits 
to be an output of a bank. Finally, we also include the number of branches as an output 
variable. Branches are expected to control for many immeasurable attributes of a bank, e.g. 
quality of services and number of accounts serviced (Berg et al., 1993; Grifell-Tatje and 
Lovell, 1996)[5]. Accordingly, in this study, banks are modeled as multi-product firms that 
produce six outputs (fixed, saving and current deposits[6], loans, investments and branches) 
and employ two inputs (labor and capital).  
 
The price of labor is defined as the ratio of established expenses to the total number of 
employees. The price of capital is measured as the ratio of physical capital expenses to fixed 
assets which is then used to normalize costs and input prices in order to impose the linear 
homogeneity restrictions. All the variables are defined in details in the Appendix Table B.1. 
The parameters of equation (3) are then estimated by the Maximum-Likelihood method using 
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the FRONTIER (Version 4.1) software developed by Coelli (1996). The log-likelihood 
function of this model is available from Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).  
 
4.3 Estimable Partial Privatization Regression 
Once the cost frontier is estimated and TFP growth is computed, we construct an index of 
TFP for every year and every bank as: 
TFP it = TFP i(t-1)[1+ PTF it]. 
The value of the index is set to 100 for the first year for all banks. Defining the logarithm of 
TFP index values as our first measure of performance, we regress it on the partial 
privatization variable as follows: 
Performanceit = α +δt + β PPit + γ Xit + εit                                                             (4) 
 
This equation is estimated using the fixed effects panel regression (within effects) model (see 
Wooldridge, 2002), where i indexes banks, t indexes years, α is the intercept, δt is a year-
specific fixed effect, β is the coefficient of the partial privatization variable PP, γ is the 
coefficient of a control variable X. We do not allow for bank-specific fixed effects as they 
lead to multicollinearity problems arising from the presence of a private sector dummy which 
we include in the model to control for those banks that belong to the private sector throughout 
our sample period. 
 
We use various proxies to represent partial privatization (PP) that we explain in details while 
presenting our empirical findings. In addition to TFP, we replace the performance variable in 
equation (4) with four different accounting ratios, viz. Operating Profit Ratio (OPR), Net 
Interest Margin (NIM), Operating Cost Ratio (OCR) and Staff Expense Ratio (SER). These 
variables are defined in the Appendix Table B.1. OPR is a simple measure of profitability as 
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it indicates how a bank is able to generate revenues over and above its costs. NIM is a 
measure of a bank‟s competence in generate income from its core businesses i.e. interest 
bearing assets. Therefore, OPR and NIM offer us two metrics of a bank‟s performance in 
terms of its revenue generating abilities. OCR measures the extent of resources used by a 
bank and SER indicates its efficiency in labor usage. These two variables are suitable 
measures of operating efficiency. Therefore, in all we have five performance measures for 
estimating equation (4).  
 
The year specific fixed effects account for unobserved year specific changes. This is 
particularly relevant in our case since the banking sector in India continues to undergo policy 
changes over the years. Moreover, the fixed effects would also help to control for competition 
effects that build up over time. Over the years as the banking sector experiences 
liberalization, intensified competition from private incumbents and the entry of de novo 
banks may affect performance of public sector banks. We expect the year specific fixed 
effects to capture such bank-invariant effects.  
 
In equation (4) the main coefficient of interest is β that is attached to the partial privatization 
variable PP.  It indicates the effects on performance that is attributable to partial privatization 
over and above those caused by other regulatory changes and bank specific attributes. As for 
the sign of this coefficient, that would get determined by whether the managerial view 
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) or the political view (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) dominates. 
For instance if the former outweighs the latter i.e. if market discipline and incentives are 
strong even for partially privatized banks, then we can expect the coefficient to have a 
positive sign for the productivity and profitability measures. In other words, partial 
privatization would yield improvement in productivity and profitability. For OCR and SER 
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we would then expect the coefficient to be negative as partial privatization would lead to cost 
savings for these banks. However in all the cases of partial privatization of Indian banks the 
government has so far retained control. This might mean that the political view dominates as 
political interference might continue to stifle the performance of the former state-owned 
banks. 
 
Finally, we include control variables Xit to account for other sources of variations in 
performance. These include SIZE (logarithm of total assets) which proxies for the ability of 
smaller banks to respond more quickly to changes in market conditions in which case its 
coefficient would be negative in the partial privatization regressions. The proportion of rural 
branches (PROP_RUR) is considered as a proxy for the business opportunity, or the lack of 
it, faced by a bank in rural areas. Its coefficient would determine whether the investment in 
rural areas has been rewarding for banks. The proportion of non-interest income to total 
income (PROP_INT) controls for banks‟ diversification activities which are expected to 
benefit them through higher productivity and profitability.  
 
4.4 Data Source 
The accounting data of banks is taken from various issues of Financial Analysis of Banks and 
Performance Highlights of Banks published by the Indian Banks‟ Association. The ownership 
and listing data is taken from various issues of Report on Trends and Progress of Banking in 
India published by the Reserve Bank of India. Among the 27 public sector banks operating in 
India, we include all but 3 in our analysis. We exclude those 3 banks which got listed in the 
last year of the sample period (see Table 1). We include the domestic private banks as a 
control group to enable us to isolate the effects of partial privatization. There were 26 private 
banks during the sample period but incomplete information was available for private banks in 
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some years leading to an unbalanced panel. We excluded new private banks which started 
operating in 1996 and hence cannot be a good control group like the older private banks. 
Moreover we do not include foreign banks as they operate in India as branches of their parent 
entities and are not listed on Indian stock exchanges like other private banks. Therefore they 
are not comparable with the Indian public sector and private banks when it comes to 
analyzing the impact of stock exchange listing on performance. A time period of 18 years is 
taken for each bank from the year 1986 to 2003[7].  
 
Table 3 presents the share of banking assets that each bank group holds. Clearly the public 
sector banks are the dominant group with over 75 percent share of banking assets. But its 
share has been declining over the sample period while those of the private groups have been 
rising. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the bank characteristics used in our 
empirical work. It appears that public sector banks are the larger group compared to private 
banks in terms of assets, deposits and loans. However among the public sector banks, those 
banks which were partially privatized are larger than those which were never partially 
privatized. Interestingly the former had a higher proportion of rural and semi-urban branches 
suggesting that they did not enjoy larger urban presence than the banks which were never 
partially privatized. But at the same time their proportion of non-interest income was higher 
indicating that they were focused on fee based activities and earnings from trading.  
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
We begin our discussion with the behavior of the TFP index and the accounting indicators as 
presented in Figure 1. The graphs indicate that public sector banks as well as private banks 
underwent improvement in productivity over the sample period. The period also witnessed 
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improvement in profitability and efficiency as indicated by the increase in OPR and decline 
in OCR and SER. The improvements are particularly pronounced for the private banks 
relative to the public sector banks. However NIM remained stable for both bank groups. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Using the five performance measures of the individual banks in each year, we estimate five 
partial privatization regressions based on equation (4). We use three specifications for the 
partial privatization (PP) variable. These are (i) a trend variable that operates after a bank 
gets listed (LIST_TREND), (ii) a continuous variable to denote the extent of private 
ownership (PRIV_SHARE), and (iii) a dummy variable for stock exchange listing 
(LIST_DUM) that takes the value one once a bank gets partially privatized. These variables 
are designed to differently capture the roles of listing and ownership share. The variable 
LIST_TREND provides a way of examining whether there is persistence in the effect of 
partial privatization on performance. PRIV_SHARE is constructed to analyze whether 
performance is related to the extent of share ownership that is privately owned. LIST_DUM 
is designed to capture the average effect of the partial privatization programme on 
performance.  
 
To address the concern of multicollinearity we present a correlation matrix of all the 
proposed independent variables in Table 5. While the three PP variables seem to be highly 
correlated, there is very low correlation among the control variables and between the control 
and PP variables. We do not include all the three PP variables in the same model but use 
them in two combinations as described in the next paragraph. In any case we checked the 
variance inflation factors for each variable in each model; in none of the cases did the VIF 
turn out to be greater than 3 thereby indicating that our models did not suffer from 
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multicollinearity problems. We correct for heteroscedasticity in all the models by estimating 
standard errors based on the Huber-White Sandwich estimator of variance. 
INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
For each performance measure we estimate two variants of equation (4) using the alternative 
definitions of the PP variable. The estimation results for these two models are presented in 
Tables 6 and 7. In Table 6, we present the results from regressing performance on 
PRIV_SHARE and LIST_TREND. We include a dummy variable PRIV_SECTOR for the 
private banks group along with the other control variables. The results reveal that the 
coefficient of PRIV_SHARE is positive for the TFP, OPR and NIM regressions and negative 
for the OCR and SER regressions. This indicates that higher divesture was associated with 
improved productivity (higher TFP) and profitability (higher OPR and NIM) while the 
efficiency effects (in terms of OCR and SER) are not statistically significant. In the TFP 
regression the coefficient of IV_SHARE is 0.0007 and is significant only at 10 percent level 
of significance. On the other hand the effects of the extent of private ownership on OPR and 
NIM are stronger. In the OPR regression the coefficient of PRIV_SHARE is 0.0218 which is 
significant at the 1 percent level of significance while in the NIM regression the coefficient of 
PRIV_SHARE is 0.0194 which is significant at the 5 percent level. In sum we find 
statistically significant evidence of improved performance owing to higher divesture in the 
case of productivity and profitability.  
 
The coefficient of LIST_TREND is statistically significant only in the TFP regression where 
it takes a positive value of 0.0220. This indicates that in the years subsequent to their 
divesture, listed banks continued to exhibit higher productivity compared to unlisted banks. 
This suggests that improvement in productivity was not a one-off phenomenon or simply a 
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“listing effect” (Gupta, 2005) but that the impact on productivity following partial 
privatization was permanent and sustained. Finally, comparing the relative magnitudes of the 
coefficients of PRIV_SHARE and LIST_TREND we observe that even though the number of 
significant coefficients is more for ownership share than for listing trend, the latter effect 
appears to be stronger in the only case where it is statistically significant. In the TFP 
regression the coefficient of LIST_TREND is 0.0220 while that of PRIV_SHARE is 0.0007. 
It seems that while the magnitude of divesture may have been important in improving 
productivity and profitability, the very effect of listing on the stock exchange played a 
stronger disciplining role in improving productivity. 
 
Moving to the control variables, we focus on those coefficients which are statistically 
significant in the estimations. First we observe that the coefficient of the private sector 
dummy in the TFP regression is -0.1008 which is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. This suggests that public sector banks had higher productivity than the private banks 
during the sample period[8]. The coefficient of this dummy variable is also significant in the 
OPR, NIM and SER regressions taking the values 0.6460, -0.3569 and -0.5722 respectively. 
These values indicate that private banks had higher profitability and efficiency than the 
public sector banks. The proportion of rural branches seems to adversely impact costs as 
indicated by its positive and statistically significant coefficients of 1.1983 and 1.7585 in the 
OCR and SER regressions respectively. However the additional expenditure owing to rural 
branches appears to have paid rewards through higher profitability and productivity as 
evidenced by the NIM and TFP regressions where the coefficients of PROP_RUR are 1.7970 
and 0.1000 respectively.  
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The proportion of non-interest income is associated with higher efficiency as the coefficients 
of PROP_NINT are negative and statistically significant for the OCR and SER regressions 
(the coefficients are -0.0036 in both cases). However non-interest income seems to be 
associated with lower NIM (the corresponding coefficient being -0.0022) which is not 
surprising since banks with higher income from non-core businesses may have less focus on 
lending activities. Finally, the coefficients of SIZE suggest that bigger banks are less 
productive (the coefficient is -0.0135 in the TFP regression) and have lower spreads (the 
corresponding coefficient is -0.3309). It seems that smaller banks were better able to take 
advantage of the changing market conditions leading to higher productivity and interest 
income. However bigger banks are more efficient as indicated by the negative coefficients on 
SIZE in the SER regression which is -0.2732. 
 
In Table 7, we present the estimates of models comparing the roles of listing effect and 
ownership share by including the LIST_DUM variable along with PRIV_SHARE. The 
findings for PRIV_SHARE are similar to the previous results for profitability. For the SER 
regression we find that the coefficient of PRIV_SHARE is -0.0139 which is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. This suggests that the extent of divesture has a negative 
association with staff expenses. In case of LIST_DUM the only statistically significant 
coefficient appears in the TFP regression. Here it takes the positive value of 0.1663 and is 
significant at the 1 percent level. This indicates that the effect of listing was to improve the 
productivity of public sector banks and as before this effect appears to dominate the 
magnitude of divesture. The results for the control variables are similar to those obtained in 
the previous estimations in Table 6.  
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
21 
 
6. Endogeneity of Partial Privatization 
In the previous section we have estimated a variety of regressions to examine the impact of 
partial privatization on bank performance. However it could be argued that the improvements 
in performance suggested by our results were not the result of privatization but because the 
better performing banks were the ones to undergo divestment. In other words there could 
have been a selection bias in identifying which banks to privatize which in econometric terms 
would amount to endogeneity of our partial privatization variables. In this section we re-
examine our results while controlling for potential selection bias. In order to do that, we start 
by re-estimating the partial privatization regressions but now consider only those banks that 
were partially privatized (see Tables 8 and 9). Thus these regressions are similar to the 
„before and after‟ privatization analyses that are often found in this literature. We find that all 
the results from these regressions are qualitatively similar to our earlier results obtained using 
the full sample.  
INSERT TABLES 8 AND 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
In addition to the above regressions, we employ a variety of other techniques to control for 
potential selection bias. First we compare the performance of the partially privatized banks 
and the non-privatized banks using the t-test for difference in means and the Wilcoxon Z-test 
for difference in medians (see Appendix Table B.2). The data for the partially privatized 
banks in these tests are restricted only to the pre-privatization years. The results indicate that 
while the partially privatized banks had lower staff expense ratio, the non-privatized banks 
had higher productivity. In terms of the rest of the performance measures there does not seem 
to have been any statistically significant difference between the two groups. As a result, we 
can infer that there is no indication of selection bias in the partial privatization programme.  
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Second, we employ the technique of instrumental variable estimation to control for the 
potential endogeneity of the partial privatization process.  We use lags of OPR, NIM, OCR 
and SER as instruments for PRIV_SHARE in the TFP regression. Similarly for each 
regression we use the lags of the other performance measures as instruments. From the results 
we observe that even after allowing for endogeneity of PRIV_SHARE our finding that 
greater private share in ownership is associated with better performance continues to hold 
(see Appendix Table B.3). The statistically significant coefficients of PRIV_SHARE in the 
OPR and SER regressions suggest that greater divesture led to improved profitability as well 
as lower costs. Next we employ an alternative method for estimating instrumental variables 
through a two-stage procedure. First the decision to privatize is estimated as a probability (by 
regressing LIST_DUM on a set of instruments) which is then used to compute fitted values of 
privatization share. This is then used as the instrumental variable in the panel data regression. 
Other than the lagged performance variables, fiscal deficit and a stock exchange index (the 
Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive Index) are used as instruments in this set of estimations. 
The results are presented in Table B.4. The coefficients of PRIV_SHARE in the OPR and 
SER regressions (0.0620 and -0.0482 respectively) are statistically significant at conventional 
levels as before. This shows that even after controlling for endogeneity using the two-stage 
procedure, we find that partially privatized banks experience improvements in profitability 
and efficiency.  
 
Finally, we address the issue of endogeneity in an alternative fashion. Following Bartel and 
Harrison (2005), we use placebo leads for the share of partial privatization variable in order 
to control for any endogeneity present in this variable. We do this by adding a lead of 
PRIV_SHARE to the above estimated regressions (see Appendix Table B.5). We find that the 
lead variable is statistically insignificant in all but one case and our original result regarding 
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the positive and statistically significant association between productivity and partial 
privatization remains robust. The only exception is the OPR regression where privatization 
may have been preceded by higher profitability. However in view of the results from all the 
alternative tests we have conducted, on balance we conclude that our main results are not 
affected by endogeneity problems. 
 
7. Conclusion  
The partial privatization programme in Indian banking since the early nineties was 
undertaken to improve the performance of public banks. While there have been a number of 
studies on bank performance in India, none so far have looked at the relationship between 
performance and partial privatization (other than examining the mean differences in 
performance as in Mohan, 2005 and Sathye, 2005). Partial privatization refers to the 
government divesting stakes in the public firm without relinquishing management control. 
Given political opposition to outright privatization, this has emerged as a feasible alternative 
for achieving some benefits of privatization. However the implications of partial privatization 
for performance are not very clear in policy debates as well as in the privatization literature. 
 
In this context, the present paper employs the method of stochastic frontier analysis to study 
performance in Indian banking over a long time horizon of eighteen years that encompasses 
the government‟s partial privatization programme. We estimate TFP from a stochastic cost 
frontier and employ it as a measure of bank performance. In addition to TFP we employ four 
accounting indicators as alternative measures of performance. Using these five measures of 
performance, we study the impact of partial privatization on bank performance through panel 
regression models.  
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The results may be summarized as follows. Public banks in India have exhibited improving 
performance during the period 1986-2003. A part of this improvement in performance can be 
attributed to partial privatization. We find that on an average, listed banks have significantly 
outperformed unlisted banks. This result corroborates the findings of Sarkar, Sarkar and 
Bhaumik (1998) who found that listed private banks in India outperform unlisted private 
banks, which in turn perform better than public banks. Here we have obtained a similar 
listing effect for public banks. Moreover we find that the effect of listing on performance is 
not a temporary phenomenon and is in fact persistent beyond the year of listing. Thus, 
performance of partially privatized banks continues to improve further after listing. Bhaumik 
and Dimova (2004) had noted a recent narrowing of the performance gap between public and 
private banks in India. Therefore, our results can be construed to suggest that the narrowing 
of the performance gap can be partly attributed to partial privatization of public banks. Our 
results also suggest that the extent to which government reduced its stakes in the public banks 
had a direct significant impact on the banks‟ performance. Thus higher is the extent of 
privatization better is the performance. These results support the managerial view of 
Holmstrom and Tirole, (1993) which suggests that even if the government partially privatizes 
state-owned firms, the forces of market discipline and consequent managerial incentives 
would be sufficient to bring about an improvement in performance. Our results are also 
confirm the findings of Mohan (2005) and Sathye (2005) who find improved performance of 
partially privatized banks by examining difference of means. 
 
We control for potential endogeneity of partial privatization in a number of alternative ways. 
First we estimate the partial privatization regressions only for those banks that were 
eventually partially privatized. Next we compare the performance of the partially privatized 
banks with the rest of the banks. Then we use instrumental variables to allow for potential 
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endogeneity in partial privatization. Finally we use placebo leads to account for the 
endogeneity. Based on our results, we conclude that even after accounting for endogeneity 
our results remain robust.  
 
Governments across the globe have at various times taken recourse to privatizing state-owned 
firms for the purpose of revenue generation as well as for achieving increase in efficiency and 
competition. While in most developed countries this has taken the form of outright sale to 
private bidders (e.g. privatization in the U.K. in the 1980s), the political and social 
idiosyncrasies of developing countries might not permit such type of privatization. There is 
often strong political opposition to what is viewed as „selling the family silver‟. Even the 
government of the day may not be willing to let go of control over state-owned firms 
especially in an industry like banking which has traditionally been a tool for achieving 
developmental goals. In such instances partial privatization may be the only viable option as 
in the case of India‟s public sector banks.  
 
The findings of this paper suggest that the post-privatization success of the partial 
privatization programme in India is clearly evidenced by improvements in performance. Our 
results add to the existing body of evidence on privatization by providing insights into the 
partial privatization in the banking industry of an emerging economy. We document that even 
when politicians might continue to exert some control over privatized banks, market 
pressures can reshape managerial incentives leading to increase in productivity, profitability 
and efficiency. 
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Figure 1: Performance Indicators for Public Sector and Private Sector Banks 
The figure presents a comparison of public and private sector banks based on the five 
performance indicators. TFP is the index of total factor productivity estimated from a 
stochastic cost frontier; OPR is operating profit ratio; NIM is net interest margin; OCR is 
operating cost ratio; SER is staff expense ratio. 
 
Log(TFP)     OPR 
 
 
NIM      OCR 
 
 
SER 
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Table 1: Timeline of Partial Privatization of Public Sector Banks till 2003 
 
This table shows the timeline of partial privatization till 2003 i.e. the last year of our period 
of analysis. Out of the 27 public sector banks in India, the 16 banks shown in this table were 
partially privatized and the remaining 11 were not (the names of the 11 banks that were not 
partially privatized are: State Bank of Hyderabad, State Bank of Indore, State Bank of 
Mysore, State Bank of Patiala, State Bank of Saurashtra, Bank of Maharashtra, Central Bank, 
Indian Bank, Punjab & Sind Bank, UCO Bank, United Bank of India). State banks refer to 
those that were always state-owned viz. the State Bank of India and its associate banks. 
Nationalized banks refer to those that were taken into government ownership during the 
nationalization programmes in 1969 and 1980. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * a further 6.6 percent of equity was sold in the year 1997. 
Source: RBI. 
Name of Bank Partial Privatization Details 
  Year Sold  Percentage of Equity Sold 
State Bank of India and Its Associates     
State Bank of India 1994     33.7 * 
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 1998 25.0 
State Bank of Travancore 1998 25.0 
    
Nationalized Banks   
Oriental Bank of Commerce 1995 33.5 
Bank of Baroda 1997 33.8 
Bank of India 1997 30.7 
Dena Bank 1997 29.0 
Corporation Bank 1998 42.8 
Syndicate Bank 2000 26.5 
Andhra Bank 2001 33.4 
Indian Overseas Bank 2001 25.0 
Vijaya Bank 2001 30.0 
Punjab National Bank 2002 20.0 
Allahabad Bank 2003 28.8 
Canara Bank 2003 26.8 
Union Bank 2003 39.1 
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Table 2: Shareholding Pattern of Public Sector Banks (end-March 2005) 
This table shows the shareholding pattern of public sector banks in India in 2005 which is the earliest year for 
which this information is provided by the RBI‟s Reports on trends and progress in banking in India. 
 
  Government 
& RBI 
FIs Foreign 
FIs 
Other 
Corporates 
Foreign 
Corporates 
Individuals Foreign 
Individuals 
Nationalized Banks       
Allahabad Bank 71.2 3.8 0.8 3.1 0 21.1 0.1 
Andhra Bank 62.5 18.9 0 1.9 0 16.8 0 
Bank of Baroda 66.8 5.8 18 1.1 0 7.3 0.9 
Bank of India 69.5 4.3 10.8 1.4 2 10.8 1.2 
Bank of Maharashtra 76.8 4.2 0.8 2.3 0 15.9 0.1 
Canara Bank 73.2 3.2 15.3 1 0 7.3 0 
Central Bank of India 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corporation Bank 57.2 29.4 10.2 0.5 0 2.7 0.2 
Dena Bank 51.2 2.9 0 7.2 0 31.1 7.6 
Indian Bank 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indian Overseas Bank 61.2 6.9 8.9 2.6 0 19.2 1.2 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 66.5 11 14 1.5 0 7 0 
Punjab & Sind Bank 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Punjab National Bank 57.8 6.4 18.3 3.3 0 14.1 0.1 
Syndicate Bank 73.5 5.3 2.7 1.6 0 16.7 0.2 
UCO Bank 75 5.8 0 3.3 1 14.8 0.2 
Union Bank of India 60.9 4.2 18.2 2.2 0 14.5 0.1 
United Bank of India 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vijaya Bank 53.9 8 13.6 3.2 0 20.7 0.8 
        
State Bank Group        
State Bank of India 59.7 11.4 19.8 2.6 0 6.4 0.1 
State Bank of Bikaner and 
Jaipur 
0 76.4 0 6.2 4.5 12.8 0 
State Bank of Hyderabad 0 100* 0 0 0 0 0 
State Bank of Indore 0 98.1 0 0.7 0 1.3 0 
State Bank of Mysore 0 94 0 0.5 0.1 5.4 0 
State Bank of Patiala 0 100* 0 0 0 0 0 
State Bank of Saurashtra 0 100* 0 0 0 0 0 
State Bank of Travancore 1.1 77.7 2 2.7 0 12.4 4.1 
 
Note: Figures reported are percentages; RBI = Reserve Bank of India; FIs = Financial Institutions; * for shares 
owned by the State Bank of India (and consequently considered by us as state-owned). 
Source: RBI. 
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Table 3: Share of banking assets held by bank groups, 1986-2003 
 
This table shows the share of total assets held by each banking group in India during our period of analysis. 
 
Year Public Private Foreign New Private 
1986 92.37 3.82 3.81 – 
1987 91.84 3.89 4.27 – 
1988 91.96 3.86 4.19 – 
1989 92.00 3.49 4.51 – 
1990 91.21 3.48 5.32 – 
1991 90.25 3.65 6.10 – 
1992 88.54 4.21 7.25 – 
1993 87.11 4.73 8.16 – 
1994 87.08 5.31 7.61 – 
1995 86.23 6.43 7.34 – 
1996 84.57 6.08 7.83 1.52 
1997 82.35 6.52 8.74 2.39 
1998 81.42 6.92 8.38 3.28 
1999 80.86 6.90 8.16 4.09 
2000 79.74 7.12 7.75 5.38 
2001 79.32 6.29 8.21 6.17 
2002 75.99 6.03 6.51 11.47 
2003 75.83 6.20 6.75 11.21 
 
Note: – for new private banks prior to their entry (new private banks are those that started operations in 1996); 
figures reported are percentages. 
Source: RBI. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the five performance indicators and the control variables used in 
the regression models. 
Bank Characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Median Maximum Minimum 
Log(TFP)      
Public banks 4.86 0.25 4.78 5.68 4.57 
   PP banks 4.87 0.25 4.79 5.63 4.59 
   Never PP banks  4.86 0.26 4.78 5.68 4.57 
Private banks 4.76 0.19 4.70 5.51 4.51 
      
Operating profit ratio      
Public banks 0.09 1.17 0.20 1.76 -8.02 
   PP banks 0.26 0.97 0.26 1.63 -6.67 
   Never PP banks  -0.10 1.35 0.15 1.76 -8.02 
Private banks 0.46 1.22 0.44 16.37 -8.51 
      
Net interest margin      
Public banks 2.52 0.81 2.60 5.73 -4.45 
   PP banks 2.53 0.77 2.62 4.73 -4.45 
   Never PP banks  2.51 0.86 2.52 5.73 0.48 
Private banks 2.80 1.87 2.74 35.31 -6.90 
      
Operating cost ratio      
Public banks 2.68 0.48 2.66 4.36 1.41 
   PP banks 2.60 0.49 2.57 3.77 1.41 
   Never PP banks  2.77 0.45 2.72 4.36 1.73 
Private banks 3.07 3.69 2.80 72.82 0.00 
      
Staff expense  ratio      
Public banks 1.97 1.13 1.92 23.65 0.85 
   PP banks 1.83 0.42 1.81 3.03 0.85 
   Never PP banks  2.13 1.59 2.01 23.65 1.17 
Private banks 1.99 0.93 1.93 11.23 0.30 
      
Proportion of Rural Branches (%)      
Public banks 66.53 5.78 67.29 80.81 46.35 
   PP banks 66.61 6.87 67.53 80.81 46.35 
   Never PP banks  66.43 4.15 66.62 76.47 55.61 
Private banks 59.59 16.92 63.30 84.38 0.00 
      
Proportion of Non-interest 
Income (%) 
     
Public banks 11.38 5.49 11.12 94.70 4.60 
   PP banks 11.29 6.64 10.93 94.70 4.61 
   Never PP banks  11.50 3.71 11.22 23.64 4.60 
Private banks 10.48 34.83 11.38 34.32 2.94 
      
Size      
Public banks 9.90 10.57 9.17 12.84 6.40 
   PP banks 10.23 10.83 9.42 12.84 6.89 
   Never PP banks  9.26 9.19 8.92 10.95 6.40 
Private banks 7.46 7.81 6.56 9.73 1.92 
Note: Size is natural logarithm of total assets (at 1993-94 prices). PP refers to partially privatized. 
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Table 5: Correlation matrix of independent variables 
 
This table presents the pair-wise correlation coefficients for all the independent variables used in the regression 
models. 
 
 PRIV_SHARE LIST_TREND LIST_DUM PRIV_SECTOR PROP_RUR PROP_NINT SIZE 
PRIV_SHARE 1       
LIST_TREND 0.7881 1      
LIST_DUM 0.9820 0.7613 1     
PRIV_SECTOR -0.2946 -0.2284 -0.3000 1    
PROP_RUR 0.0177 0.0165 0.0292 -0.2674 1   
PROP_NINT 0.0053 0.0041 0.0054 -0.0193 -0.0557 1  
SIZE 0.3866 0.3318 0.3805 -0.7632 0.2753 0.0221 1 
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Table 6: Partial Privatization and Bank Performance: Roles of listing trend and ownership 
share 
 
The five performance indicators are regressed on the percentage of shares held by the private owners 
(PRIV_SHARE) and a variable that operates as a trend once a bank is listed (LIST_TREND). PRIV_SECTOR 
is a dummy variable for banks in the private sector. Panel regression technique (within effects) is employed to 
estimate the model. 
  
 Log (TFP) OPR NIM OCR SER 
PRIV_SHARE 0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
0.0218*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0194*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0030 
(0.0082) 
-0.0001 
(0.0045) 
LIST_TREND 0.0220*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0862 
(0.0554) 
-0.0258 
(0.0159) 
0.0107 
(0.0185) 
-0.0057 
(0.01252) 
PRIV_SECTOR -0.1008*** 
(0.0171) 
0.6460*** 
(0.1799) 
-0.3569** 
(0.1706) 
-0.0796 
(0.5152) 
-0.5722*** 
(0.0890) 
PROP_RUR 0.1000** 
(0.0410) 
0.6713 
(0.5117) 
1.7970*** 
(0.2085) 
1.1983** 
(0.5630) 
1.7585*** 
(0.2480) 
PROP_NINT 0.0000 
(<0.0001) 
0.0009** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0022*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0036*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0036*** 
(0.0003) 
SIZE -0.0135*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0595 
(0.0455) 
-0.3309*** 
(0.0670) 
-0.2086 
(0.1749) 
-0.2732*** 
(0.0305) 
INTERCEPT 4.8401*** 
(0.0211) 
-0.7239* 
(0.3721) 
2.7741*** 
(0.2224) 
2.8585*** 
(0.5050) 
2.0677*** 
(0.1154) 
      
R-square 0.1994 0.0510 0.0824 0.0140 0.1009 
No. of obs. 828 841 841 841 841 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors (Huber-White). ***, ** and * indicate statistically 
significant coefficients at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 7: Partial Privatization and Bank Performance: Roles of listing effect and ownership 
share 
 
The five performance indicators are regressed on the percentage of shares held by the private owners 
(PRIV_SHARE) and a dummy variable that indicates whether a bank is listed or not (LIST_DUM). 
PRIV_SECTOR is a dummy variable for banks in the private sector. Panel regression technique (within effects) 
is employed to estimate the model. 
 
 Log (TFP) OPR NIM OCR SER 
PRIV_SHARE -0.0024 
(0.0016) 
0.0258*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0220* 
(0.0107) 
-0.0234 
(0.0176) 
-0.0139** 
(0.0049) 
LIST_DUM 0.1663*** 
(0.0253) 
-0.3765 
(0.2246) 
-0.1573 
(0.4120) 
0.7059* 
(0.3731) 
0.4413 
(0.2693) 
PRIV_SECTOR -0.0948*** 
(0.0160) 
0.6302*** 
(0.1857) 
-0.3625* 
(0.1779) 
-0.0637 
(0.5246) 
-0.5634*** 
(0.0900) 
PROP_RUR 0.0937** 
(0.0404) 
0.6794 
(0.5160) 
1.8014*** 
(0.2185) 
1.1689* 
(0.5769) 
1.7390*** 
(0.2492) 
PROP_NINT 0.0000 
(<0.0001) 
0.0009** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0022*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0037*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0036*** 
(0.0003) 
SIZE -0.0115** 
(0.0041) 
0.0542 
(0.0480) 
-0.3328*** 
(0.0696) 
-0.2037 
(0.1780) 
-0.2704*** 
(0.0312) 
INTERCEPT 4.8341*** 
(0.0236) 
-0.7031* 
(0.3734) 
2.7809*** 
(0.2265) 
2.8503*** 
(0.5111) 
2.0652*** 
(0.1138) 
      
R-square 0.1912 0.0491 0.0823 0.0142 0.1014 
No. of obs. 828 841 841 841 841 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors (Huber-White). ***, ** and * indicate statistically 
significant coefficients at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 8: Partial Privatization and Bank Performance (Only Partially Privatized Banks): Roles 
of listing trend and ownership share 
 
The five performance indicators are regressed on the percentage of shares held by the private owners 
(PRIV_SHARE) and a variable that operates as a trend once a bank is listed (LIST_TREND). The sample for 
this estimation consists of only those banks that went on to be partially privatized. Panel regression technique 
(within effects) is employed to estimate the model. 
 
 Log (TFP) OPR NIM OCR SER 
PRIV_SHARE 0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0179*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0095** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0070** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0091*** 
(0.0020) 
LIST_TREND 0.0194*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0529 
(0.0444) 
-0.0254 
(0.0182) 
-0.0392** 
(0.0160) 
-0.0473*** 
(0.0129) 
PROP_RUR 0.6259*** 
(0.0854) 
0.0424 
(0.5688) 
-0.0534 
(0.2862) 
0.9968*** 
(0.2243) 
1.3426*** 
(0.1750) 
PROP_NINT 0.0138 
(0.0236) 
-0.0547 
(0.1423) 
-7.9421*** 
(0.4668) 
0.9449*** 
(0.3188) 
0.8475*** 
(0.2383) 
SIZE -0.0154*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0250 
(0.0206) 
-0.2463*** 
(0.0560) 
-0.1643*** 
(0.0425) 
-0.1052*** 
(0.0327) 
INTERCEPT 4.5090*** 
(0.0391) 
0.2298 
(0.3890) 
3.6484*** 
(0.2449) 
2.8696*** 
(0.2433) 
1.6085*** 
(0.2009) 
      
R-square 0.4266 0.0365 0.4797 0.2083 0.2143 
No. of obs. 234 234 234 234 234 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors (Huber-White). ***, ** and * indicate statistically 
significant coefficients at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 9: Partial Privatization and Bank Performance (Only Partially Privatized Banks): Roles 
of listing effect and ownership share 
 
The five performance indicators are regressed on the percentage of shares held by the private owners 
(PRIV_SHARE) and a dummy variable that indicates whether a bank is listed or not (LIST_DUM). The sample 
for this estimation consists of only those banks that went on to be partially privatized. Panel regression 
technique (within effects) is employed to estimate the model. 
 
 Log (TFP) OPR NIM OCR SER 
PRIV_SHARE 0.0007 
(0.0008) 
0.0275*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0024 
(0.0087) 
-0.0239*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0298*** 
(0.0059) 
LIST_DUM 0.0247 
(0.0321) 
-0.4513 
(0.3003) 
0.2008 
(0.3027) 
0.5230 
(0.4214) 
0.6432 
(0.3984) 
PROP_RUR 0.6189*** 
(0.0977) 
0.2879 
(0.6229) 
-0.1816 
(0.3969) 
0.6733** 
(0.2683) 
0.9452*** 
(0.2091) 
PROP_NINT 0.0329** 
(0.0125) 
-0.1279 
(0.1030) 
-7.9544*** 
(0.4629) 
0.9376*** 
(0.3279) 
0.8394*** 
(0.2495) 
SIZE -0.0103*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0527*** 
(0.0189) 
-0.2447*** 
(0.0592) 
-0.1542*** 
(0.0470) 
-0.0926** 
(0.0373) 
INTERCEPT 4.4942*** 
(0.0499) 
0.1976 
(0.4014) 
3.7121*** 
(0.2282) 
3.0014*** 
(0.2103) 
1.7705*** 
(0.1679) 
      
R-square 0.3413 0.0342 0.4773 0.2104 0.2186 
No. of obs. 234 234 234 234 234 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors (Huber-White). ***, ** and * indicate statistically 
significant coefficients at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix A 
 
Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), the Divisia index of TFP growth for multiple 
outputs can be written as: 
XYPTF   =  
j
jj
m
mm xSyR                                 (A.1) 
where, Rm = pmym/R is the observed revenue share of output ym, pm is the price of output ym, 
and R =Σm pmym is total revenue. Likewse, Sj = wjxj/C is the observed cost share of input xj, wj 
is the price of input xj, and C =Σj wjxj is total cost. Here a „.‟ over a variable indicates its 
growth rate, i.e., jx = 
t
x j

 ln
. 
Equation (A.1) is hard to estimate especially in the case of banks due to unavailability of 
price information and so it needs to be transformed into an estimable form. Consequently we 
consider the following stochastic cost frontier: 
ln E = ln C (Y,W,t) + U + V                                          (A.2) 
where, E = WX is total expenditure, X = (x1,…,xN)’ is a (N x 1) vector of inputs, W = 
(w1,…,wN )‟ is a (N x 1) vector of input prices, Y = (y1,…,yM)‟ is a (M x 1) vector of outputs, t 
is a time trend that proxies technical change, C(Y,W,t) is the deterministic kernel of the 
stochastic cost frontier, U ≥ 0  is the one-sided cost  inefficiency term, and V is a random 
variable with  zero mean.  
 
Totally differentiating equation (A.2), we obtain the following expression: 
t
U
tWYCwSyRtWYE
n
nn
m
mm


  ),,(),,(    
Solving this for
m
mm yR  , substituting it in (A.1) and using the fact 
that n
n
nnn
n
nn wExwxExwE    )/()/( , leads to the following expression: 
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where 
m
m
tWY
tWY
Y
),,(
),,(

  is a measure of output growth, ),,( tWYm is cost elasticity of the 
m
th
 output and 
m
m tWYtWY ),,(),,(  . Here )(
Cyy   captures the impact on productivity 
change of departures from marginal cost pricing and along with n
n
nn wtWYSS ]),,([  , gives 
a measure of input allocative efficiency change. Assuming allocative efficiency yields the 
following estimable expression for TFP growth: 
t
U
YtWYtWYCPTF c


  )],,(1[),,(                       (A.3) 
 
Defining returns to scale as the inverse of ),,( tWY , expression (A.3) provides a 
decomposition of TFP into the following components: contribution of technical change 
measured by cost diminution ( ),,( tWYC ), contribution of scale effect ( cYtWY )],,(1[  ), 
and contribution of efficiency (
t
U


 ). Denoting these three components by 1PTF
 , 2PTF   and 
3PTF
  respectively, we can define TFP growth as a sum of its three components: 
321 PTFPTFPTFPTF
 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B.1: Description of Variables 
 
This table defines all the variables used in this study. 
 
List of variables Definition 
Variables used in estimating total factor productivity 
(These are obtained from balance sheets and hence indicate end-year balances) 
Fixed deposit Term deposit 
Savings deposit Interest bearing checkable deposit  
Current deposit Non-interest bearing checkable deposit 
Loans Loans and advances including bills, cash credit, overdrafts and 
term loans 
Investments Investments in shares, bonds and other instruments 
Branches Number of branches - domestic and international 
Labor Number of employees - officers, staff and clerical 
Capital Value of fixed assets such as premises 
Price of labor Ratio of establishment expenses to total employees where 
establishment expenses refer to payments to and provisions 
for employees 
Price of capital Ratio of capital expenses to fixed assets where capital 
expenses refer to expenses on physical capital e.g. rent, taxes, 
lighting, insurance, depreciation, repairs and maintenance 
  
Variables used as accounting indicators of performance 
(These are obtained from profit and loss accounts and hence indicate transactions during the year 
recorded at end-year) 
Operating Profit Ratio Ratio of operating profit to total assets 
Net Interest Margin Ratio of interest income minus interest expense to total assets 
Operating Cost Ratio Ratio of operating expenses (on labor and capital) to total 
expenses 
Staff Expense Ratio Ratio of payments and provisions to employees to total 
expenses 
  
Variables used as determinants of productivity and performance 
(These are obtained from balance sheets and hence indicate end-year balances) 
Size Logarithm of total assets 
Proportion of rural branches Ratio of number of rural branches to total number of branches 
Proportion of non-interest income Ratio of income from non-interest bearing activities (e.g. 
commission, exchange, brokerage, revaluation, sale of 
investments and assets) to total income 
  
Variables capturing privatization 
PRIV_SHARE The percentage of shares held by private owners 
LIST_TREND A trend variable that operates once a bank is listed (i.e. takes 
the value 0 in all years prior to listing and 1,2,3 etc. after listing) 
LIST_DUM A dummy variable that indicates whether a bank is listed or not 
PRIV_SECTOR A dummy variable for banks in the private sector 
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Table B.2: Performance Comparisons of Non-Privatized Banks and Partially Privatized 
(PP) Banks But Considered Only Before the Listing Year 
 
This table presents statistical tests of differences between public banks that were never privatized and those that 
went on to be partially privatized based on the five performance indicators. 
 
 Mean of never PP 
banks  
(Median of never PP 
banks) 
Mean of PP banks  
 
(Median of PP 
banks) 
t-stats for 
difference 
in mean 
(p-value) 
Wilcoxon – Z 
for difference in 
Median 
(p-value) 
Log (TFP)  4.8607 
(4.7786) 
4.7316 
(4.6978) 
5.72  
(<0.0001) 
-3.0257 
 (0.0012) 
 
OPR -0.1025 
(0.1500) 
0.0036 
(0.1700) 
 
-0.82  
(0.4127) 
 
1.1638 
 (0.1222) 
     
NIM 
 
2.5113 
(2.5250) 
2.3689 
(2.4200) 
1.58 
 (0.1148) 
-1.1182 
(0.1317) 
 
OCR 2.7724 
(2.7250) 
2.7068 
(2.7200) 
 
1.34 
(0.1804) 
 
-0.1864 
(0.4260) 
     
SER 2.1344 1.9052 1.79 -2.8254 
 (2.0150) (1.9100) (0.0743) (0.0024) 
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Table B.3: Partial Privatization and Bank Performance: Instrumental Variables (1987-2003) 
 
The five performance indicators are regressed on the percentage of shares held by the private owners 
(PRIV_SHARE) – which for each regression is instrumented using lags of other performance indicators, fiscal 
deficit and stock market index. Panel regression technique (within effects) is employed to estimate the model. 
 
 Log (TFP) OPR NIM OCR SER 
PRIV_SHARE -0.0010 
(0.0025) 
0.1145*** 
(0.0377) 
0.0940 
(0.0823) 
-0.2318 
(0.1504) 
-0.1291*** 
(0.0409) 
PRIV_SECTOR -0.1026*** 
(0.0187) 
0.6893*** 
(0.1991) 
-0.4645* 
(0.2383) 
-0.2925 
(0.4267) 
-0.7265*** 
(0.1114) 
PROP_RUR 0.0843* 
(0.0447) 
0.5884 
(0.5578) 
1.5194*** 
(0.2006) 
1.3300** 
(0.5364) 
1.6664*** 
(0.2491) 
PROP_NINT -0.0001 
(<0.0001) 
0.0007* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0022*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0035**** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0034*** 
(0.0002) 
SIZE -0.0087** 
(0.0039) 
0.0553 
(0.0517) 
-0.3897*** 
(0.0970) 
-0.2268 
(0.1693) 
-0.3162*** 
(0.0223) 
INTERCEPT 4.8466*** 
(0.0261) 
-0.9526* 
(0.4505) 
3.0312*** 
(0.6644) 
3.5851*** 
(0.2545) 
2.7447*** 
(0.1401) 
      
R-square 0.1509 0.0624 0.0874 0.0307 0.1332 
No. of obs. 821 821 821 821 821 
Note: Instrument validity was ascertained by checking that the instruments are highly correlated with 
PRIV_SHARE but weakly correlated with the residuals. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors 
(Huber-White). ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant coefficients at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table B.4: Partial Privatization and Bank Performance: Instrumental Variables with 2 stage 
estimation (1987-2003) 
 
The five performance indicators are regressed on the percentage of shares held by the private owners 
(PRIV_SHARE) – which for each regression is instrumented using lags of other performance indicators, fiscal 
deficit and the BSE index. A two-stage estimation procedure is used for the instrumental variable by modeling 
the privatization decision in the first stage and the quantum of privatization in the second stage. Panel regression 
technique (within effects) is employed to estimate the model. 
 
 Log (TFP) OPR NIM OCR SER 
PRIV_SHARE .0048 
(0.0047) 
0.0620*** 
(0.0214) 
0.0771* 
(0.0450) 
-0.1376 
(0.0928) 
-0.0482* 
(0.0248) 
PRIV_SECTOR -0.0047*** 
(0.0207) 
0.7105*** 
(0.2096) 
-0.3782* 
(0.2022) 
-0.2673 
(0.4632) 
-0.6779*** 
(0.1121) 
PROP_RUR 0.0994* 
(0.0486) 
0.6407 
(0.5815) 
1.7649*** 
(0.2781) 
1.3615** 
(0.5277) 
1.8629*** 
(0.2911) 
PROP_NINT -0.0001* 
(<0.0001) 
0.0007* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0023*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0035**** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0035*** 
(0.0003) 
SIZE -0.0108** 
(0.0040) 
0.0634 
(0.0539) 
-0.3421*** 
(0.0798) 
-0.2192 
(0.1777) 
-0.2900*** 
(0.0271) 
INTERCEPT 4.8432** 
(0.0318) 
-0.8626* 
(0.4519) 
2.6801*** 
(0.3288) 
3.2729*** 
(0.3794) 
2.2390*** 
(0.1166) 
      
R-square 0.8101 0.1722 0.1339 0.0521 0.1744 
F test for no fixed 
effects 
111.94*** 4.92*** 3.42*** 1.43* 2.01*** 
No. of obs. 821 821 821 821 821 
Note: Year fixed effects were included in all regressions but are not reported to conserve space. Instrument 
validity was ascertained by checking that the instruments are highly correlated with PRIV_SHARE but weakly 
correlated with the residuals. 
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Table B.5: Partial Privatization and Bank Performance: Placebo Leads (1986-2002) 
 
The five performance indicators are regressed on the percentage of shares held by the private owners 
(PRIV_SHARE) – considered contemporaneously as well as placebo leads viz. the value of the variable in the 
next period. Panel regression technique (within effects) is employed to estimate the model. 
 
 Log (TFP) OPR NIM OCR SER 
PRIV_SHARE (LEAD) 0.0009 
(0.0006) 
0.0241*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0207 
(0.0139) 
0.0012 
(0.0042) 
0.0008 
(0.0052) 
PRIV_SHARE 0.0017*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0083 
(0.0058) 
-0.0028 
(0.0056) 
-0.0049 
(0.0075) 
-0.0023 
(0.0051) 
PRIV_SECTOR -0.0941*** 
(0.0172) 
0.6739*** 
(0.1966) 
-0.3371* 
(0.1816) 
-0.0608 
(0.5493) 
-0.5809*** 
(0.0955) 
PROP_RUR 0.1045** 
(0.0431) 
0.5865 
(0.5317) 
1.8364*** 
(0.2133) 
1.2069* 
(0.6047) 
1.7833*** 
(0.2610) 
PROP_NINT 0.0000 
(<0.0001) 
0.0009** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0021*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0036*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0036*** 
(0.0003) 
SIZE -0.0137*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0550 
(0.0502) 
-0.3442*** 
(0.0707) 
-0.2086 
(0.1862) 
-0.2807*** 
(0.0305) 
INTERCEPT 4.8106*** 
(0.0241) 
-0.7182* 
(0.3928) 
2.7503*** 
(0.2342) 
2.8654*** 
(0.5262) 
2.0879*** 
(0.1212) 
      
R-square 0.1830 0.0550 0.0874 0.0143 0.1014 
No. of obs. 788 799 799 799 799 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors (Huber-White). ***, ** and * indicate statistically 
significant coefficients at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Notes 
                                                 
[1] 1994 was the first year of partial privatization in Indian banking. Therefore the time 
period 1986-2003 offers us a suitable sample period for a before and after comparison. We 
have 8 years data (1986-1993) before the partial privatization programme began and 10 years 
data after (1994-2003). 
 
[2] The disclosure guidelines are available on the regulator‟s website at 
http://www.sebi.gov.in/guide/dip2009.pdf 
 
[3] The subscript i which stands for individual banks, and the subscript t which stands for 
years were omitted from equation (2) earlier to preserve clarity of notations. Also the random 
variables are now specified in lowercase to refer to the error terms for individual banks. 
 
[4] Establishment expenses refer to the wage bill for officers, clerks and other support staff. 
As wages are jointly bargained by the bank employees association in India, we do not expect 
the endogeneity of wages to be a serious problem in estimating the cost function. 
 
[5] We may also note that all estimations with the inclusion of branches yield higher values 
of the log likelihood function as compared with the case when branches are dropped. 
 
[6] Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) argue against clubbing the three categories of deposits 
together. We too feel that since bank policies regarding each category are different and the 
ratio of these three categories has been varying over time, it is important to treat them as 
separate variables in the cost function. 
 
[7] The starting year is chosen as 1986 to coincide with the shift of the bank accounting 
system in India from that based on calendar year to financial year. Starting with 1986, the 
financial year covers the period from April of one year to March of the following year. Thus 
the financial year 1986 covers the period from April 1985 to March 1986.  
 
[8] While this result is consistent with Mohan (2005) it appears to contradict the findings of 
Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003). However the latter used a sample till 1997 whereas we 
consider six additional years during which public sector banks considerably outperformed 
private banks in terms of TFP (see figure 1). 
